Three papers were published by Chizuko Yoshimizu.
1 How Did Tibetans Learn a New Text from the Text’s Translators and Comment on It? The Case of Zhang Thang sag pa (Twelfth Century)
In: Cross-Cultural Transmission of Buddhist Texts: Theories and Practices of Translation, ed. Dorji Wangchuk. Indian and Tibetan Studies 5. Hamburg: Department of Indian and Tibetan Studies, University of Hamburg, 2016, pp. 353–372.
＊This book was edited by Prof. Dorji Wangchuk of the University of Hamburg. He also contributed to this volume the article entitled “A Ratinale for Buddhist Textual Scholarship.”
In the period of the later diffusion (phyi dar), a number of Buddhist texts were newly introduced to Tibet from India. Those who played a central role during the first stage of this transmission of texts were Indian paṇḍitas and Tibetan lo tsā bas. They interpreted the new texts they translated and educated their Tibetan students about these texts. In this way, the Tibetans developed their own scholastic and educational system in their monasteries. This first generation of scholars who contributed to the transmission of Candrakīrti’s (7th c.) Madhyamaka works include Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055?–1145?) and his Indian collaborators. Zhang Thang sag pa is supposed to have been his desciple. In this paper, I surmise that he studied the Prasannapadā and composed this commentary under the following circumstances:
1) He learned the text mainly from its translator Pa tshab and an Indian paṇḍita.
2) He further studied and interpreted the text himself, occasionally emending his teachers’ interpretation.
3) He composed the commentary in order to provide a more elaborate interpretation of the Prasannapadā than other contemporary rivals who also studied and interpreted the same treatise.
2 Transmission of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Prasannapadā to Tibet from Kashmir
Around Abhinavagupta. Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir from the Ninth to the Eleventh Century. Eds. Eli Franco and Isabelle Ratié, Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Süd- und Zentralasiens 6. Leipzig, October 2016, pp.645-663.
Since the publication of newly discovered Tibetan manuscripts from the tenth to thirteenth century begun in 2006 in China, a large number of textual witnesses that were once presumed to be lost have become available. The present paper examined how the most fundamental Madhyamaka treatises, i.e., Nāgārjuna’s (second c.) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) and Candrakīrti’s (seventh c.) commentary on it named Prasannapadā (PsP), were studied, translated, and transmitted from Kashmir to Tibet or from teacher to student.
To summarize the transmission process of the MMK and PsP to Tibet from Kashmir and their dissemination into the Tibetan Buddhist scholastic circle through Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and his collaborators, the following phases may be assumed:
1) Pa tshab Nyi ma grags studied the MMK and PsP in Kashmir during his 23 year stay. He translated the PsP into the Tibetan language with the aid of the Kashmiri scholar Mahāsumati, using a Sanskrit manuscript accessible there. They also revised Klu’i rgyal mtshan’s earlier translation of the MMK in accordance with the citations and interpretations of the MMK in the PsP. Since the earlier translation was based on Bhāviveka-Avalokitavrata’s interpretation, their revision work of the MMK introduced a shift in authority for studying the MMK from Bhāviveka to Candrakīrti.
2) Pa tshab himself composed a commentary on the MMK relying on Mahāsumati’s lectures who explained the MMK based on Candrakrti’s interpretation.
3) Pa tshab revised his translations of the PsP and the MMK with Kanakavarman in Tibet, referring to the second Sanskrit manuscript from a “borderland” of India.
4) Pa tshab composed a commentarial work to explain difficult points in the PsP on the basis of Tshong dpon paṇḍita’s guidance. Pa tshab himself left instructions on the relation between the chapters of the MMK for educational purposes (Le ʼbrel pa tshab kyi man ngag).
3 Dharmakīrti no kibyū ronshō no saikaishaku (Dharmakīrti’s Statement of Consequence (prasaṅga) Revisited
Tetsugaku-shisō ronshū 42 (Studies in Philosophy), University of Tsukuba, pp. 33-54, 2016.
The present paper aims to reinterpret Dharmakīrti’s statement of consequence (prasaṅga) that appears in his Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 (PVin 3: 4, 4-9, see Appendix (1)). The main points I have discussed anew are the followings:
i. Dharmakīrti presents this prasaṅga statement as that which is formulated by means of the properties constructed by the other (paraparikalpita) in contrast to a formal inferential proof (anumāna) endowed with either svabhāva-, kārya-, or anupalabdhihetu. Cf. footnotes 2 and 8.
ii. Following Dignāga’s view that both proof (sādhana) and refutation (dūṣaṇa) need a logical reason that is established for both parties, Dharmakīrti sets forth in his prasaṅga statement a logical reason that is established for both parties (i.e., “it lacks another self-nature that is not qualified by the unification with a single substance restricted to a particular place, time and state”), though it is the property borrowed from the other.
iii. This prasaṅga also works as an indirect proof of the opposite (viparyayasādhana) of the other’s thesis. The opposite of the other’s thesis here means that that which is present in a multitude and single is impossible, or never exists. This can be proven on the basis of the pervasion in terms of positive and negative concomitances, i.e., “whatever is single cannot be present in a multitude,” and “whatever is present in a multitude cannot be single.”
iv. Dharmakīrti, in my view, intends to show that a prasaṅga reasoning works as a kind of inference-for-others (parārthānumāna) in terms of both refutation and indirect proof if it is endowed with a proper logical reason. Hence, he does not seem to think it necessary to reformulate the prasaṅga into a formal inferential proof or prasaṅgaviparyaya.
v. With regard to “acceptance” (abhyupagama / upagama), though it is understood to refer to a dogmatic acceptance or the tentative acceptance of the opponent’s presupposition, Dharmakīrti’s emphasis seems to be on it that an acceptance should be gained equally by both parties only after examination (parīkṣā, vicāra) through argument (yukti).
vi. This means that both parties should justly accept the consequence through the examination that the consequence necessarily follows the acceptance of the logical reason, because the pervasion is established in reality.
*The English and Japanese translations of Dharmakīrti’s discussion on prasaṅga in PVin 3 (p.4, l.4 – p.6, l.12) are given in Appendix above. I have added the revisions of my previous reading in footnotes to the body of the present paper and the Appendix.